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The Impacts of International Migrants’ Remittances on 
Household Consumption Volatility in Developing 
Countries 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the impacts of remittances on reducing volatility of 
household consumption using a panel dataset of 84 developing countries during the period 
from 1980 to 2014.  Our study is a partial replication of Combes & Ebeke (2011), who first 
investigated this issue using data for the period of 1975 to 2004 and found that 
international migrants’ remittances reduce household consumption volatility in 
developing countries. We improve their study by using more recent data, additional 
control variables, and by investigating the long run and the short run implications of 
international remittances in developing countries. Our results show that the volatility of 
household consumption can significantly be reduced by international migrants’ remittances. 
The robustness checks reinforce the stabilising impact of migrants’ remittances on 
consumption volatility in developing countries. Since overall consumption is an integral part 
of household welfare, the findings of this study highlight that international migrants’ 
remittances may indeed contribute significantly to households’ welfare by reducing the 
volatility of consumption in remittance receiving developing countries both in the short and 
long run.  
Keywords: Remittances, Consumption Volatility, Developing Countries, 
System GMM, Communist countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the flows of international remittances among 
different nations have increased dramatically due to globalisation. Moreover, 
migrants’ remittances have been considered a growing private source of external 
finance in developing countries after foreign direct investment (FDI). For instance, 
migrants’ remittances to developing countries were approximately three times higher 
than official development assistance (ODA) and almost half of FDI that those 
countries received in 2011 (Ratha, 2013). In addition, remittance flows to developing 
countries were more stable than other financial flows even when the global economy 
had been affected by the global financial crisis in 2009 (Ratha, 2013; De, et al., 2016). 
In 2014, international remittances to developing countries were $436 billion and were 
projected to reach $479 billion by 2017 (World Bank, 2015). 
Despite the increasing volume and stable nature of international remittances 
to developing countries, relatively little attention has been paid to its contribution to 
household consumption smoothing.  Since the volatility of household consumption 
might be increased due to the output shocks caused by trade liberalisation in an 
economy to a greater extent, it might inversely affect the household welfare in 
developing countries (Ahmed & Suardi, 2009; Di Giovanni & Levchenko, 2009). 
Therefore, it is indeed necessary for policy-makers to rethink the determinants of 
economic stabilisation, giving emphasis on consumption smoothing. While it is 
obvious that international remittances may act as a shock transmitter to the remittance 
recipient countries during the economic downturn in migrants’ host countries, 
remittances can also play a role as a shock absorber in stabilising the output volatility, 
as well as consumption volatility caused by internal negative shocks, such as natural 
disasters (Jidoud, 2015; Bettin, et al., 2014). 
Although the impacts of international remittances on a wide range of issues 
have been investigated by the existing literature, the study of the impact of migrants’ 
remittances on household consumption volatility is very limited.  To the best of our 
knowledge, only Combes & Ebeke (2011) examined the association between 
international remittances and household consumption volatility using a panel dataset of 
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87 developing countries for the period of 1975 to 2004. They found an inverse 
relationship between international migrants’ remittances and instability in household 
consumption.  They also revealed that international remittances can play the role of 
insurance at the time of income shocks for the households. They also added that the 
overall consumption stabilizing role of remittances become weaker if a country 
received remittances of more than 6 percent of its GDP.  However, they did not 
consider the influences of government investment on fixed capital (e.g. roads, bridges, 
railways, markets etc). In this study we partially replicates Combes & Ebeke (2011)’s 
study by re-examining the role of remittances to reduce households’ consumption 
volatility using more recent data for the period of 1980 to 2014. In addition,  we extend 
Combes & Ebeke (2011)’s study (1) by using additional control variables, (2) 
considering government investment on fixed capital formation, (3) conducting further 
sensitivity analysis and (4) by investigating the long and short run implications of 
international remittances in developing countries. This study also considers possible 
bias in the measurement of consumption volatility caused by the difference in the 
public goods distribution system between communist and non-communist developing 
countries. Hence, the major research questions investigated in this study are: do 
remittances significantly reduce household consumption volatility?  Does the 
inclusion of communist countries in the sample affect the measurement of the impact 
of remittances on consumption volatility? And, what are the impacts of remittances in 
reducing consumption volatility in the short and long run? We use a new panel dataset 
composed of 84 developing countries for which reasonable information of remittances 
and other required variables are available. The system GMM estimation is used to 
address possible biases due to reverse causality and potential endogeneity of 
remittances in this paper. The OLS and the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations are 
also used to check the consistency of the results. The ratio of remittances to GDP for 
neighbouring countries and the log weighted GDP per capita of five top most 
migrants’ host countries are used as two external instruments expecting that the 
potential “weak instrument” problem of traditional GMM estimator would be 
weakened. Furthermore, the Pesaran and Smith-type Pooled Mean Group estimators are 
also used to find out the short and long run effects of international remittances on 
consumption volatility. Controlling for all other factors, we find evidence that 
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international migrants’ remittances significantly contribute to stabilising the volatility 
of household consumption in developing countries. However, the magnitude of this 
stabilising impact of remittances is stronger while the influences of the communist 
countries are excluded from the sample. 
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses governments’ 
policy interventions to increase the inflow of international remittances. Section 3 
presents a detailed review of existing literature on international remittances, while 
Section 4 discusses the relationship between international remittances and the 
volatility of household consumption. Section 5 describes the data sources and 
empirical strategy used in this study. Section 6 discusses the empirical findings of this 
study, and section 7 concludes. 
2. Government policy interventions to increase inflow of international 
remittances  
Realising the importance of remittances on household consumption and the country’s 
welfare, developing countries should strive to implement policies to increase 
remittance flows and promote transfers through formal channels. Due to the high cost 
of remittance transfer through formal channels, international migrants’ prefer illegal 
methods to send money to their home country. However, among different policy 
initiatives, tax exemption for remittance income is one of the most successful policies 
implemented by most remittance-receiving countries today. For instance, when 
Vietnam exempted its 5 percent tax on remittances in 1997, the flow of remittances 
through formal channel increased considerably. Similarly, the amount of remittance 
transferred by non-resident Bangladeshis through the banking channel is fully 
exempted from income tax in Bangladesh (Amjad et al. 2013). Another most effective 
policy for attracting remittances through formal channels is the relaxation of controls 
over the foreign currency transactions. In this system, more banks and financial 
institutions are permitted to take part in the foreign exchange transactions. The most 
successful example is from Bangladesh. In 2000, the Ministry of Finance liberalized 
the exchange rate policy, making it free-floating and allowing the market to decide 
the exchange rate, which has helped curb hundi transactions significantly in 
Bangladesh (Siddiqui, 2004).  
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Better provision of financial services is another important policy adopted by 
many developing countries. To reduce the cost and time of remittance transfer to the 
remittance receiving countries, many governments are nowadays allowing more of 
their domestic banks, mobile phone operators, and different microfinance institutions 
to operate financial services to their migrants working in other countries. For instance, 
the Groupe Banques Populaires bank has picked up 66 percent of total remittances to 
Morocco by offering low fees, simple procedures, and other non-financial services to 
Moroccans abroad (Amin & Caroline, 2005).  
It is well known that the strength of the ties between the worker and his or her 
home country is a must to increase the remittance inflows in the receiving countries. 
To achieve this objective, policies related to loan schemes and bonds targeted at the 
migrants seems to be useful in many countries. For example a number of countries 
have effectively issued premium bonds to their diaspora at attractive interest rates and 
tax exemption facilities (for Bangladesh, China, India, Lebanon, Pakistan and the 
Philippines, see Carling 2005). Schemes were an important factor behind the doubling 
of remittance flows to India between 2002 and 2003 (Amjad et al. 2013). In addition, 
policies related to the travel and customs privileges are also very useful to strengthen 
the ties between the worker and his or her home country. Following this policy, many 
remittance-receiving countries allow their international migrants to bring certain 
amount of goods and equipment as tax free.  
It is evident that policies to increase remittance are not independent; rather, they are 
interlinked based on the characteristics of receiving countries. For example, countries 
like Mexico and the Philippines tend to have well established institutional frameworks 
to train, support, and ensure the welfare of their expatriates abroad with more 
successful remittance programs. Some countries help migrants with searching for 
employment abroad, pre-migration information and orientation (Philippines, 
Bangladesh), IDs for customs and other purposes (Colombia, Tunisia), finance for 
study (Tunisia), support in legal and administrative disputes (Morocco) and hotline 
for migrant investors (Tunisia). Although, some countries like Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand have tried to impose mandatory remittance 
requirements on their emigrants, they have achieved only little success. In addition, 
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restrictive emigration policies have driven migrants into using clandestine remittance 
channels. 
 
3. Review of literature 
The impacts of remittances on household welfare, poverty reduction and 
income inequality have been studied by many researchers. Some researchers found 
that the depth and severity of poverty can greatly be reduced by the inflow of foreign 
remittances (Acosta, et al., 2008; Adams & Page, 2005; Gupta, Pattillo & Wagh, 2007; 
Brown, & Jimenez, 2007). The study conducted by Jimenez & Brown (2012) in Tonga 
found that 31 percent of the national poverty rate can be reduced through remittances, 
while their impact on the depth of poverty is about 49 percent. Moreover, household 
welfare, as well as income and consumption expenditures, can also be increased 
through remittances received by family members. In addition, large households and 
particularly female headed households may enjoy greater income stability due to 
remittances received (Catalina & Pozo, 2011). Seemingly, other non-migrant 
households, mostly relatives and friends, may also benefit from international migrant 
households through sharing norms and social pressures (Brown, et al., 2014). 
Evidence also shows that remittances may sometimes worsen income inequality and 
rural-urban inequality in the remittance receiving country, mainly because incomes 
via remittances tend to be invested mostly in the urban sector (Carling, 2004). 
Similarly, Adams & Cuecuecha (2010) found an increasing Gini coefficient of 
inequality when remittances are included in the household income in Indonesia. On 
the other hand, Acosta, et al. (2008) found a negative correlation between international 
remittances and income inequality in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Adams 
& Klobodu (2017) did not find any robust impact of remittances on income inequality 
in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
 The impacts of remittances on growth have been studied by a number of 
researchers and many of them found a positive effect of remittances on economic 
growth, while others found the opposite. For example, some studies (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009; Helen& Robert, 2007) argued that international remittances can 
positively contribute to economic growth in developing countries in the absence of a 
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properly functioning credit market. In a similar study, Zuniga (2011) also found a 
positive association between remittances and economic growth, which may vary with 
geographical distributions of remittance receiving countries. However, Ahamada & 
Coulibaly (2013); Adams & Klobodu (2016) found no causal relationship between 
remittances and economic growth in Sub-Saharan countries.  Similarly, some studies 
(see, for example, Barajas, et al., 2009; Chami, et al., 2005) found that economic 
growth may sometimes be negatively affected by remittances. 
Several other studies (see, for example, Bugamelli & Paterno, 2009, 2011; 
Chami, Hakura & Montiel, 2009) examined the impact of remittances on output 
growth (GDP per capita) stabilisation in developing countries and found positive 
effects. Anzoateguiet al.  (2014) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) found that 
remittances can strengthen the financial development of the recipient country and can 
be used to meet its needs during negative income shocks (Osili 2007). In another 
recent study, Mohapatra et al. (2012) found that remittances had been used as an ex 
post coping strategy during natural disasters such as floods, droughts and earthquakes 
in order to smooth household consumption in countries such as Bangladesh and 
Ethiopia. They also found that remittances had also been used as ex ante investment 
as part of risk management after negative income shocks in Burkina Faso and Ghana, 
where remittance receiving households built their houses with concrete rather than 
mud. Bettin, et al. (2014) found a negative correlation between remittances and the 
business cycles. 
A small number of studies examined the impact of policies on international 
remittances inflow using qualitative analysis, and some of these policy initiatives are 
discussed in the above section. Buencamin and Gorbunov (2002) and Carling (2005) 
used qualitative analysis along with some case studies to examine the impact of 
remittances policies. Siddique (2004) interviewed a number of key people from 
different public and private officials from different financial institutions in 
Bangladesh to investigate the policy impact on international remittances. Amjad et al. 
(2013) explored the impact of remittance policies based on descriptive analysis of 
remittance data from different countries. They calculated the growth in remittance 
inflows in relation to different time periods.  However, in a later study, Carling (2008) 
mention that economic performance, financial development and financial openness 
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are the most commonly used determinants of remittance inflows. In our present study, 
we have used the KAOPEN index and bank credit as a proxy for financial openness 
and financial sector development respectively. 
Combes & Ebeke (2011)’s study was the first that investigated the impact of 
migrants’ remittances on household consumption volatility.  They found that 
remittances can significantly reduce the consumption instability in developing 
countries by playing the role of insurance during periods of negative income shocks. 
Jidoud (2015) also examined the relation between international remittances and 
consumption volatility as a part of their study in African countries. He found very 
small impact of remittance on reducing consumption volatility in African countries. 
However, both these studies (Combes & Ebeke (2011); Jidoud (2015)) have not 
considered the influences of government investment on fixed capital formation. It is 
worth nothing that government investment on fixed capital formation that/which 
produces fixed assets is an important factor for household consumption. These fixed 
assets are produced assets that are used repeatedly for the production process for more 
than one year. For instance, the stock of produced fixed assets are roads, bridges, 
markets, airports, railways, schools, hospitals, residential and non-residential 
buildings, transport equipment, office equipment, and so forth. Although it is obvious 
that these assets play a significant role in accelerating and smoothing household 
consumption, the household by itself could not create these assets. Therefore the 
present study has considered government investment on fixed capital formation to 
capture its external effect on household consumption volatility. Furthermore, this 
study also considers the possible bias in the measurement of consumption volatility 
caused by the difference in the public goods distribution system between communist 
and non-communist developing countries. It is well known that there is a big 
difference in the economic system between the democracy and communism ideology. 
In communism, the government has complete control over the production and 
distribution of resources. This system prevents any single person or household from 
rising to a higher position than others. Therefore, households might not be able to use 
international remittances to increase their consumption according to their desired 
level. On the contrary, a household from a democratic/non-communist/capitalist 
country is able to increase its consumption level without any restriction. Hence, it is 
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indeed necessary to analyse consumption volatility, considering the possible bias in 
measurements due to the factors of communism and non-communism.  A recent study 
by De et al. (2016) found that workers’ remittances are more stable than all other types 
of financial flows and this helps to smooth household consumption over the business 
cycle. However, the reverse causality of international remittances and long and short 
run effects have not been considered in De et al. (2016). This study addresses these 
issues using different estimations methods and using most recent data available up to 
2014. Hence, this study certainly captures the effect of the 2009 Global Financial 
Crisis on international remittances as well.   Therefore, this study will be an important 
addition to the existing literature.  
 
4. International remittances and the volatility of household consumption 
Following the work of Bugamelli & Paterno (2009), Combes & Ebeke (2011), 
and Jidoud (2015), the standard deviation of household consumption per capita 
growth is defined as the volatility of consumption in this study. Although the volatility 
of private consumption is driven by a number of factors such as: economic shocks, 
factors of household income elasticity to these shocks, and factors of household 
consumption elasticity to household income shocks, various country characteristics 
are also responsible for household consumption volatility (Wolf, 2004). For instance, 
large economies with diversified productiontend to positively affect the volatility of 
consumption. Likewise, volatility in fiscal policy can also be associated with 
consumption instability (Herrera & Vincent, 2008).  
 
[Fig. 1(a) about here] 
 
However, the trends of consumption volatility in different regions for all 
developing countries in figure 1(a) show that the household consumption in 
developing and transitory economies in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region 
and the South Asia (SA) region is more volatile as compared to other regions in all 
developing countries. In contrast, the other regions such as East Asia and the Pacific 
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(EAP), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) regions have experienced an overall 
decreasing trend in consumption volatility during the period 1980 to 2014. Even 
though the SSA region shows a decreasing trend in consumption volatility, the 
volatility of consumption is still higher in that region compared to other regions shown 
in figure 1(a).  
 
[Fig. 1(b) about here] 
 
In addition, the trend in consumption volatility of the developing and 
transitory economies of the Europe and Central Asia region has changed substantially, 
while all the former and present communist countries are excluded from the sample 
as shown in figure 1(b). As well as this, the East Asia and Pacific region also has 
experienced a considerable change in the trend of consumption volatility while all 
communist countries are excluded from the sample. These findings could be a reason 
to re-think the measurement of the impact of remittances on consumption volatility, 
assuming a possible bias caused by the nature of the public goods distribution system 
of former and present communist countries within the group of developing countries. 
Since some regions with a low (high) level of remittances do not always produce a 
high (low) level of consumption volatility in the given data for our analysis, it seems 
difficult to confidently predict an inverse relationship between migrants’ remittances 
and the volatility of consumption. However, the East Asia and Pacific region and the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region of all developing countries (including all former and 
present communist countries) and the Sub-Saharan Africa region while excluding all 
communist countries, show low level of remittances with a high level of consumption 
volatility. In contrast, the Middle East & North Africa region has experienced a high 
level of remittances with a low level of consumption volatility in our given dataset. 
Therefore, these findings could be a sign of the impact of remittances on the volatility 
of household consumption, which this study tries to investigate further in the empirical 
analysis.  
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5. Empirical Strategy and Data 
We use the following empirical specification to estimate the impact of 
international remittances on consumption volatility in developing countries.  
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛_𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , 
where 𝜎cit is defined as the consumption volatility and is estimated by the 
standard deviation of the real consumption per capita growth over non-overlapping 5-
year periods. Country and non-overlapping 5-year periods are expressed by i and t 
respectively and their corresponding fixed effects are indicated by vi and 𝜇 t 
respectively. Thus, time invariant heterogeneity is expected to be controlled by 𝜇t and 
periodical shocks among countries are expected to be controlled by vi. The 
idiosyncratic disturbance term is denoted by 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 . R is denoted as the remittance 
variable, measured as the ratio of personal remittances received to GDP.  Following 
the World Bank’s (2010) definition, the remittance variable is comprised of migrant 
workers’ remittances and compensations of employees. In the baseline specification, 
the standard deviation of household consumption per capita growth (𝜎cit) is a function 
of the ratio of remittance to GDP (Ri,t), the log of initial GDP per capita (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡), 
the ratio of government consumption to GDP (𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡), the ratio of trade openness 
to GDP ( 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ), the output growth volatility ( 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ), the 
government investment growth volatility ( 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ), the ratio of bank 
provided private sector credit  to GDP (𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡), the ratio of foreign aid to 
GDP (𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡), and financial openness (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛_𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡). The key coefficient of interest 
is 𝜑1 which shows the correlation between remittances and volatility of household 
consumption. A negative sign of the remittances coefficient, 𝜑1< 0, offers evidence 
in favour of the stabilising impact of remittances on household consumption volatility. 
Since the initial level of income could capture the heterogeneity of a country’s 
technological progress (Sala-i-Martin, 1994; Barro, 1991), the 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is included, 
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with the expectation that the volatility of consumption would be higher in lower per 
capita income countries than that of the higher income countries. 
In order to control the size of the government, the 𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  variable is used 
such that a larger government size could be associated with macroeconomic instability 
and economic inefficiency in developing countries (Bekaert et al., 2006). Therefore, 
consumption volatility may exhibit a positive relationship with the size of the 
government in developing counties. Likewise, the trade openness variable is also used 
expecting a positive correlation (𝛽3> 0) with the consumption volatility (Di Giovanni 
& Levchenko, 2009). In addition, a positive sign for the 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 variable, 
𝛽4 > 0, is expected to grasp the collective shocks on volatility of household 
consumption in developing countries (Herrera & Vincent, 2008; Combes & Ebeke, 
2011). Since government investment in fixed capital formation, such as investment in 
land improvements, construction of roads, schools, hospitals and so forth, is an 
important factor for facilitating household consumption, 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is included 
expecting a positive relation, 𝛽5 > 0, with consumption volatility. Again, the 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 variable is included to capture the financial development of a country 
assuming that the efficiency of the financial market could largely influence the extent 
of consumption volatility in developing countries (Ahmed & Suardi, 2009; Bekaert et 
al., 2006). Since the availability of bank provided private sector credit is an important 
determinant for household consumption smoothing, the ratio of bank provided private 
sector credit to GDP is treated as the proxy for financial development (Combes & 
Ebeke, 2011). Two alternative variables, namely broad money (M2) to GDP ratio 
(M2/GDP), and the banks’ deposit to GDP ratio are used as alternative measures of 
financial development to re-examine the stabilising role of remittances on the 
consumption volatility. The financial openness variable is used to capture the effect 
of the global financial systems on consumption volatility. The dynamic nature of the 
consumption volatility is captured by the lag level of the dependent variable. 
The estimation of the above equation using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimator will be biased and inconsistent because the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term due to the presence of fixed effects (Combes & Ebeke, 
2011). Hence, the system GMM estimator is employed in this study since it allows for 
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the lagged differences and lagged levels of the explanatory variables as an instrument. 
The potential endogeneity of remittances and other explanatory variables are 
controlled by the system GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998). Additionally, two 
external instruments are used with the expectation that the potential “weak 
instruments” problem of the traditional GMM estimator would be weakened. These 
external instruments are: (1) the ratio of remittances to GDP for neighbouring 
countries located in the same region and (2) the log-weighted GDP per capita of the 
five top most migrants’ host countries (Acosta, Baerg & Mandelman, 2009; Aggarwa 
et al., 2011). The first instrument is used to capture the regional trend of remittances 
in remittance receiving countries, including changes in transaction costs, while not 
affecting the consumption volatility in recipient countries. In addition, the impact of 
the economic condition of the migrants’ host countries on the flow of remittances will 
be captured by the later instrument, assuming that the economic condition of migrants’ 
host countries is not directly related with the consumption volatility of the recipient 
countries. Since the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the 
instruments, two specification tests are used: (1) the Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions assuming the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid overall, and, 
(2) the autocorrelation test which examines the hypothesis that there is no second-
order serial correlation in the first differenced error term (Arellano & Bond, 1991; 
Roodman, 2009). Moreover, the OLS and the Instrumental Variable (IV) approaches 
are also used to check the consistency of the results obtained by the system-GMM 
estimator. In addition, the Pesaran and Smith-type Pooled Mean Group estimators are 
used to find out the long and short run relationships among remittances and 
consumption volatility, considering the dynamic heterogeneity in the panel dataset. 
Since we were not able to find any suitable indicator for remittance policies that is 
common for all developing countries, we are not able to empirically investigate the 
impact of remittance policies on the international migrants’ remittances in developing 
countries.  
 
5.1 Data sources 
The World Development Indicator 2015 is used as the main source of data for 
constructing a large panel consisting of 84 developing countries over the period from 
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1980 to 2014. Additionally, data for the variables of private credit ratio and bank 
deposit ratio were collected from the Global Financial Development database 2015 of 
the World Bank for the same periods. The data period and countries are selected based 
on the availability of information required for all variables in the study. The dataset is 
then rearranged into 7 observations by taking the average of non-overlapping 5-year 
periods. As a result, 7 observations per country were available in the panel dataset for 
this study. Furthermore, the dataset is also rearranged into overlapping 5-year periods 
which increases the number of observations and time series dimensions needed for 
the pooled mean group estimations.The precise definition of each variable and their 
sources are shown in table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The financial openness variable is measured using KAOPEN from the Chinn-
Ito Index (2014) which measures the degree of openness of a country’s capital 
accounts. A greater value of this index reflects that the country is more open to cross-
border financial transactions. Chinn & Ito (2008) have used the following four major 
categories of restrictions on external accounts in construction of the KAOPEN index: 
(1) the presence of multiple exchange rates, (2) the restrictions on current account 
transactions, (3) the restrictions on capital account transactions, and (4) the 
requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (Combes & Ebeke, 2011; Kose, 
Prasad & Terrones, 2003).  Summary statistics of different variables in all developing 
countries are presented in table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
6.1 Empirical results 
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Across all estimations, the control variables in this study are the log of initial 
GDP per capita, the ratio of government consumption to GDP, the ratio of trade 
openness (total trade volume) to GDP, the output growth volatility (standard deviation 
of GDP per capita growth), the government investment volatility (standard deviation 
of government investment growth), the ratio of available bank credit to GDP, the ratio 
of aid inflow to GDP, and the financial openness variable. 
Table 3 shows the impacts of remittances on the volatility of household 
consumption in all developing countries (including former and present communist 
countries). The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique has been estimated using the 
country and time fixed effects based on the Hausman test for fixed effects without 
considering the dynamic nature of the panel dataset. After controlling for all other 
explanatory variables, the results reveal that the coefficient of the ratio of remittances 
to GDP is about 0.06 which is negative and is statistically significant at the five 
percent level. It suggests that the standard deviation of household consumption growth 
is decreased due to an increase in the ratio of remittances to GDP, which is, in turn, 
related to a decrease in consumption volatility in developing countries. Among all the 
control variables included in the OLS estimation, the coefficients for the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP, the ratio of trade openness to GDP, the standard 
deviation of GDP per capita growth (output growth volatility), and the standard 
deviation of government investment growth (govt. investment volatility) are positive 
and statistically significant, meaning that consumption volatility increases due to the 
increase in those variables. On the other hand, the coefficient for the ratio of available 
bank credit to GDP is also statistically significant and negatively related to the 
volatility of consumption. Therefore, the consumption volatility decreased due to an 
increase in the ratio of bank credit to GDP in the private sector. Although the 
coefficients for other control variables such as log of initial GDP per capita, the ratio 
of aid flow to GDP, and financial openness have the sign as expected, these are not 
statistically significant in the OLS estimation. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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The results obtained using the instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
considering all control variables other than the lag of dependent variable are shown in 
column 2 of table 3. Two external instruments such as the ratio of remittances to GDP 
for neighbouring countries located in the same region for each country, and the log-
weighted GDP per capita of the five top most migrants’ host countries for each country 
have been used for the IV estimation. The results show that the coefficient of the ratio 
of remittances to GDP is not only statically significant, but also about 6.5 times larger 
than that of the OLS estimation. Unlike the OLS estimation presented in table 3, the 
IV estimation shows the significant and negative impact of the initial GDP per capita 
on consumption volatility, suggesting that initial relative income of a country is an 
important factor for reducing the volatility of household consumption. Like the OLS 
estimation presented in table 3, the coefficients for the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP, and the ratio of trade openness to GDP are also positive and 
statistically significant where the magnitude of the variables are larger than that of the 
OLS estimation. In addition, the output growth volatility and the government 
investment volatility are also positively and significantly associated with the volatility 
of consumption. As well as this, the ratio of bank credit to GDP also reveals the 
negative impact on consumption volatility while the size of the coefficient is almost 
same as obtained from the OLS estimation. Among all control variables, the ratio of 
aid flows to GDP, and the financial openness have not shown any significant impact 
on the volatility of consumption. Although the IV estimation certainly captures the 
biases caused by the measurement error, it does not address the problem of reverse 
causality (Aggarwal, et al., 2011). 
The last column of table 3 reports the results obtained using the system GMM 
estimation for all developing countries (including the former and present communist 
countries). Results reveal that the coefficient of the ratio of remittances to GDP, 0.14, 
is negative and highly significant at the one percent level. This finding reinforces the 
stabilising impact of remittances on consumption volatility considering the potential 
endogeneity of remittances in developing countries. Furthermore, the size of the 
coefficient of the ratio of remittances to GDP is also consistent with the results 
obtained from the OLS and IV estimations. Among other control variables included 
in the system GMM estimation in table 3, the log initial GDP per capita, and the ratio 
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of bank credit to GDP shows the negative and significant impact on consumption 
volatility. On the other hand, the coefficients of the ratio of government consumption 
to GDP, the ratio of trade openness to GDP, the output growth volatility, and the 
government investment volatility are positive and significant in the system GMM 
estimation. Like the two other estimations (OLS and IV) presented in table 3, the ratio 
of aid flows to GDP, and financial openness do not appear to be associated with 
consumption volatility in the system GMM estimation. The Hansen test confirms the 
validity of the instruments, and the autocorrelation tests also do not reject the model 
due to the presence of second order serial correlation in the system GMM framework. 
 Table 4 presents the empirical results obtained from different estimators with 
the exclusion of the influences of the former and present communist countries on 
consumption. In the first column, the results from the OLS estimation show the 
significant and negative impact of the ratio of remittances to GDP on the volatility of 
consumption considering the effects of other control variables as fixed. In addition, 
the magnitude of the coefficient of the ratio of remittances to GDP (0.075) is almost 
similar to that estimated without considering the influences of all communist countries 
on consumption. Among all control variables included in the OLS estimation in table 
4, the coefficients for the ratio of government consumption to GDP, the ratio of trade 
openness to GDP, output growth volatility, and the government investment volatility, 
are positive and statistically significant. Additionally, the ratio of available bank credit 
to GDP is also statistically significant at the 10 percent level with the expected sign. 
Other control variables such as the log of initial GDP per capita, the ratio of aid flows 
to GDP, and financial openness do not have any significant impact on consumption 
volatility. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The empirical results obtained from the IV estimation while excluding the 
influences of former and present communist countries presented in table 4 also 
confirm the negative association between the ratio of remittances to GDP and the 
consumption volatility. Moreover, the size of the coefficient for the remittance 
variable is 0.40, which is almost similar to that obtained considering the influences of 
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all former and present communist countries on consumption. However, the magnitude 
of this coefficient is about 5.5 times larger than that of the OLS estimation as shown 
in table 4. The coefficients for all control variables other than financial openness are 
also statistically significant in the IV estimation. 
 The last column of table 4 reports the system GMM estimation results without 
consideration of the influences of former and present communist countries. Results 
show that the coefficient for the ratio of remittances to the GDP variable is negative 
and statistically significant at the one percent level. This result also reinforces the 
finding obtained from the OLS and IV estimations. The magnitude of the coefficient 
for the remittances variable is 0.186, which shows a stronger stabilising impact of 
remittances on the volatility of consumption. Although the size of the remittance 
coefficient is about 2.5 times larger than that of the OLS estimation, it is about 2 times 
smaller than the result obtained from the IV estimation presented in table 4. As well 
as this, the coefficient for the ratio of bank credit to GDP is negative and significant. 
Among other control variables, the ratio of trade openness to GDP, the output growth 
volatility, and the government investment volatility are found to be positively and 
significantly associated with the volatility of consumption, whereas the initial GDP 
per capita is significantly and negatively associated with the household consumption 
volatility. The diagnostic tests for the system GMM estimation presented in table 4 
also confirm the validity of the instrumentation in the system GMM framework. 
 
6.2 Robustness checks 
 Since financial development of a country has been considered as an important 
determinant of consumption smoothing, two alternatives of financial development 
have been used to re-examine the stabilising contribution of remittances to the 
volatility of household consumption based on the financial development. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The ratio of bank deposits to GDP, and the ratio of broad money to GDP (M2 
/GDP) instead of the ratio of bank credit to GDP have been used as the proxy variable 
for financial development in table 5. After controlling for the ratio of bank deposit to 
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GDP along with other control variables in table 5, the results in column 1 and column 
3 show the highly significant and negative association of international remittances 
with consumption volatility in developing countries. Moreover, the size of the 
coefficient for the remittances variable in column 3 is 0.19, which is larger than that 
of column 1 (0.15), when the influences of former and present communist countries 
have not been excluded.  Likewise, the broad money to GDP (M2/GDP) ratio has been 
used as an alternative measurement of financial development in column 2 and column 
4. The findings also reinforce the stabilising impact of international remittances on 
the volatility of household consumption following the same trend as other measures 
of financial development in developing countries.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
The results of robustness checks after controlling for fewer variables for all 
developing countries including former and present communist countries have been 
reported in table 6. At the beginning, this study has controlled for the lag of 
consumption volatility, and log of initial GDP per capita in column 1. The ratio of 
government consumption to GDP and the government investment volatility are used 
as additional control variables in column 2 and column 3, respectively. Although the 
results obtained still suggest the significant stabilising impact of international 
remittances on the volatility of household consumption, the diagnostic tests fail to 
confirm the validity of instrumentation in the system-GMM framework. The 
diagnostic tests confirm the validity of the instrumentation (with a negative and 
significant impact of remittances on consumption volatility) when the ratio of trade 
openness to GDP is introduced in column 4. Moreover this negative and significant 
relation between remittances and consumption volatility has not been changed even 
when the output growth volatility, the ratio of bank credit to GDP, the ratio of aid flow 
to GDP, and financial openness variables have been used as additional control 
variables in the regressions from column 5 to column 8. However, the ratio of aid flow 
to GDP and financial openness variable do not show any significant impact which are 
added into the column 7 and 8 respectively. 
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[Table 7 about here] 
 
 Table 7 presents the results for robustness checks controlling for fewer 
variables using the system GMM estimation, excluding the influences of former and 
present communist countries. The diagnostic tests confirm the validity of the 
instrumentation in the SYS GMM framework in all the regressions except in column 
1 and column 3. The ratio of international remittance to GDP significantly contributes 
to stabilising the volatility of consumption when the government consumption to GDP 
variable is introduced as an additional control variable in column 2. The findings of 
other columns also reinforce the significant and negative impact of international 
remittances on the volatility of household consumption, regardless of which control 
variables are introduced one by one across all columns in table 7. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the coefficient for the ratio of remittances to GDP is found to be stronger 
compared to the results presented in table 6 following the same order to control 
additional variables from column 1 to column 8. 
 
6.3 Pooled mean group estimation (PMG) results 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 8 reports the results of the PMG estimations of the long and short run 
coefficients of international remittances on household consumption volatility along 
with other control variables. The co-integration equations are estimated following 
Pesaran et al. (1999), and do not include trends. The estimation provides more 
interesting results. First, we notice that while the coefficients of almost all control 
variables excluding the ratio of aid flows and financial openness are significant in the 
long run estimations (both in column 1 and 3), only the ratio of bank credit and the 
ratio of remittance to GDP are significant in the short run (in column 2 and 4). Since 
short run coefficients mainly reflect adjustment of the economy to shocks (Eggoh & 
Bangake 2012), our results suggest that international remittances are certainly capable 
in reducing the volatility of household consumption in the short run. The reasoning 
behind this is that capital flows in the form of international remittances in the short 
term, which might be used to finance the consumption during bad times of the 
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households. However, the magnitude of the coefficient of remittance variable in the 
long run (0.18) is about 6 times higher than that of this in the short run (0.03) in all 
countries. Likewise, the magnitude of the remittance coefficient, while excluding the 
communist countries, is about 0.23, which is about 4.5 times larger than in the short 
run. Therefore, it is evident from the PMG results that as a source of relatively stable 
foreign capital, international remittances are playing important roles in reducing 
household consumption volatility both in the short run as well as in the long run.  
 
6.4 Discussion 
International remittances can be used for the consumption of durable goods as 
well as non-durable consumption of goods which both help to smooth the 
consumption growth of remittance receiving households. Nevertheless, international 
remittances can also play a role as insurance for smoothing the consumption during a 
period of various negative income shocks in the country. According to the results of 
this study, the household consumption volatility can be reduced to about 1.4 to 1.8 
points with a 10 point increase in the remittance inflows. The results are consistent 
with the findings of Bettin, et al. (2014); and Chami, et al. (2009). The magnitude of 
this coefficient is much lower than in Combes & Ebeke (2011), the reason may be 
that, our study has used most recent data from 1980 to 2014 and extended the coverage 
period than that of Combes & Ebeke (2011). Our study captures the global financial 
crises in 2009 and has used an additional control variable with different estimations. 
Although Combes & Ebeke (2011) found significant impact of financial openness on 
consumption volatility, our study doesn’t find this relationship as significant. 
Furthermore, the consumption volatility may be amplified due to an increase 
in trade openness and the size of the government. Although the magnitude of the trade 
openness of this study is almost similar with Combes & Ebeke (2011), the magnitude 
of government consumption is almost half in size. This result is not surprising, since 
the government investment in fixed capital formation could have influence on the 
government consumption. On the other hand, the volatility of consumption is lower 
in more developed countries, since the initial GDP per capita is negatively associated 
with consumption volatility. These results are consistent with the findings of early 
studies (Bekaert et al., 2006; Herrera & Vincent, 2008; Chami et al., 2009). In 
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addition, this study also suggests that a small increase in output volatility (e.g. one 
point) will cause 0.42 to 0.45 point increase in household consumption volatility. The 
magnitudes of the output volatility are almost similar to Combes & Ebeke’s (2011) 
findings. However, less volatile government investment in various fixed capital 
formation such as land improvements (construction of drains, fences, ditches, etc.), 
construction of roads, highways, markets, schools, hospitals, and so forth, is 
associated with less volatile consumption. While smooth growth of government 
investment in fixed capital formation facilitates household consumption from the 
country specific side, international remittances could directly contribute to stabilising 
the volatility of consumption by increasing the purchasing power of remittance 
receiving households. Although this suggests that consumption smoothing could 
depend on the level of financial development of a country, the magnitude for 
consumption smoothing is much lower than that of international remittances. 
Furthermore, it is evident from our findings that only remittances, as a macro variable, 
have the consumption volatility reducing ability both in the short and long run. For 
instance, 0.18 to 0.23 point consumption volatility (table 8) reduction is possible in 
the long run with only one unit increase in the remittance inflows. Nevertheless, the 
robustness checks confirm the stabilising impact of international remittances on the 
volatility of household consumption, regardless of the controls or measurement of 
financial development used in this study. Additionally, our findings confirm the bias 
in the measurement of the impact of remittances on consumption volatility due to the 
difference in public goods distribution systems between the communist and non-
communist developing countries. Therefore, the overall findings of this study have 
confirmed the significant and robust relationship between international remittances 
and the consumption volatilities of developing countries using additional controls and 
different estimates than in Combes & Ebeke (2011).  
 
7. Conclusions 
Although the impact of international remittances has increasingly been 
recognised, its contribution in reducing the volatility of household consumption has 
not been studied thoroughly. Therefore, a better understanding of the impact of 
remittances on the consumption volatility is important. Using panel data of 84 
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developing countries for the period 1980 to 2014, this study partially replicates the 
study of Combes & Ebeke (2011) to investigate the role of international migrants’ 
remittances as a source of external finance that may help in reducing the 
macroeconomic volatility of household consumption in developing countries. 
However, we improve Combes & Ebeke (2011)’s study in several ways. We extend 
data coverage period of Combes & Ebeke (2011) by using more recent data.  We 
consider the influences of government investment on fixed capital formation, which 
have not been considered by Combes & Ebeke (2011). In addition, we consider the 
potential measurement bias of consumption volatility caused by the difference in the 
public goods distribution system between communist and non-communist developing 
countries. We also examine the long and short run impacts of international remittances 
in developing countries.  
Although the results of our study confirms the inverse relationship between 
consumption volatility and international remittances, the magnitude of consumption 
volatility  stabilizing effect  is lower than that in Combes & Ebeke (2011).  The results 
of this study suggest that remittance receiving countries exhibit, on average, lower 
consumption volatility. This result is robust, since we consider the biases arising from 
omitted variables, reverse causation and measurement error. In addition, the 
magnitude of the stabilising impact of remittances on consumption volatility is found 
to be much stronger in the long run. Therefore policymakers should develop 
appropriate policies that increase international remittance inflows in order to achieve 
consumption stabilisation in the short and long run. Countries should be aware of, 
evaluate, and learn from the successes and failures of other countries when designing 
and implementing remittance policies of their own. However, policies to maximize 
remittance inflows and channel them into productive uses should be seriously 
considered to increase the living standard, especially for countries with significant 
number of workers abroad. Lowering the remittance transfer costs and improving 
financial systems in remittance receiving countries would be major instruments in 
attracting more remittance inflows through formal channels.  The main findings of 
this study reveal that the stabilising impact of remittances on consumption volatility 
is appreciably acceptable, as the remittance flow is found to be more stable compared 
to other capital flows that act as external sources of capital in developing countries. 
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The findings of this study, therefore, highlight that international migrants’ remittances 
may indeed contribute significantly to households’ welfare by reducing the volatility 
of consumption in remittance receiving developing countries. 
 
Although some interesting findings are revealed in this study, a few caveats pertain. 
Firstly, we were not able to identify any common indicator of remittance policy for 
all developing countries. Therefore, we are not able to empirically investigate the 
impact of remittance policies on international remittances. Further, heavy dependence 
by the remittance receiving country on the international remittance flow as an external 
source of finance may lead to an increase in macroeconomic vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks; this issue has not been considered in this study. These issues are 
beyond the scope of the current study and deserve future investigation.  
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Figures 
 
 
Fig. 1(a) Regional trend of consumption volatility in all developing countries 
(including former and present communist countries) 
 
 
Source: Calculated by the authors using the World Bank Development Indicator, 2015. 
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Fig. 1(b) Regional trend of consumption volatility in all developing countries 
(excluding former and present communist countries). 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition  Sources 
𝜎 Standard deviation of household consumption 
per capita growth (Consumption volatility), 
estimated over non-overlapping 5-year periods. 
 World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
R Sum of remittances, migrants transfers and 
workers compensation as a ratio to GDP 
 World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
IniGDP Logarithm of initial GDP per capita at the 
beginning of each period at constant 2010 US$ 
 World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
Gov_con The ratio of total government consumption 
expenditure to GDP 
 World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
Trade_open Sum of exports and imports measured as a ratio 
to GDP.  
 World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
GDP_volatility Standard deviation of GDP per capita growth 
estimated over non-overlapping 5-year periods. 
 World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
Inv_volatility Standard deviation of government fixed 
investment growth (annual) estimated over non-
overlapping 5-year periods 
 World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
Bank_credit The ratio of private credit provided by deposit 
money banks to GDP 
 Global Financial 
Development , 2015 
Aid The ratio of official development aid (ODA) and 
other official aid to GDP 
 World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
Finan_open Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN)  web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chi
nn-Ito_website.htm 
M2 / GDP The ratio of broad money to GDP  World Development 
Indicator, 2015 
Bank Deposit / 
GDP 
The ratio of deposits by deposit  money banks to 
GDP 
 Global Financial 
Development,  2015 
GDP per capita 
of migrants’ 
host country 
GDP per capita of five top most migrants’ host 
countries, weighted by the share of migrants of 
the remittance receiving countries. 
 Bilateral Migration 
Matrix of the world 
Bank 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of different variables in all developing countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SD of household consumption per 
capita growth 487 0.052765 0.049165 0.00046 0.480738 
Log of initial GDP per capita 558 7.545192 1.077581 4.898139 9.899512 
Ratio of Govt. consumption to GDP 546 0.145256 0.055888 0.02601 0.428533 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP 551 0.714549 0.352116 0.091057 2.055394 
SD of GDP per capita growth 564 0.033658 0.027114 0.002703 0.22845 
SD of Govt. investment growth 495 0.137592 0.151733 0.003901 1.94548 
Ratio of Bank credit to GDP 552 0.278506 0.230738 0.003351 1.465452 
Ratio of Bank Deposit to GDP 554 0.306727 0.265432 0.020393 2.266332 
Ratio of M2 to GDP 552 0.407664 0.301128 2.36E-05 2.462965 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP 551 0.057737 0.070365 4.33E-06 0.467924 
Financial openness 550 1.674918 1.314775 0.105202 4.389193 
Ratio of remittances to GDP 502 0.042389 0.081824 0.00019 0.844556 
Note: “SD” refers to the Standard Deviation. 
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Table 3: The impacts of international remittances on household consumption in 
developing countries (including former and present communist countries). 
Dependent variable: Standard deviation (SD) of household consumption per 
capita growth. 
 OLS IV SYS GMM 
Independent Variables    
 
Lag of dependent variable 
   
0.076 
   (0.057) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.001 -0.033* -0.056** 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.022) 
Ratio of Govt. consumption to GDP 0.110* 0.147** 0.190*** 
 (0.063) (0.066) (0.057) 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.034** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
SD of GDP per capita growth 0.357*** 0.362*** 0.427*** 
 (0.118) (0.104) (0.123) 
SD of Govt. investment growth 0.111*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) 
Ratio of bank credit to GDP -0.023* -0.022* -0.024* 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP 0.007 -0.065 -0.077 
 (0.062) (0.080) (0.071) 
Financial openness 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ratio of remittances to GDP -0.060** -0.383*** -0.138*** 
 (0.022) (0.106) (0.042) 
Constant 0.011 0.095 0.019 
 (0.029) (0.060) (0.034) 
Observations 418 418 371 
Countries 83 83 83 
R squared 0.364 0.213  
AR(1) p-value   0.003 
AR(2) p-value   0.374 
Hansen p-value   0.349 
Instruments   26 
Notes: The estimation method is one step System GMM and time effects are included in all the 
regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  “***”, “**” and “*” denote significant at 
1% level, 5 % level and 10 % level respectively. 
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 Table 4: The impacts of remittances on household consumption in developing 
countries (Excluding former and present communist countries). Dependent 
variable: Standard deviation (SD) of household consumption per capita 
growth  
 OLS IV SYS GMM 
Independent variables    
    
Lag of dependent variable   0.092 
   (0.063) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.024 -0.011* -0.010** 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.005) 
Ratio of Govt. consumption to GDP 0.128* 0.136** 0.225*** 
 (0.072) (0.066) (0.067) 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP 0.042** 0.053*** 0.043** 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) 
SD of GDP per capita growth 0.356** 0.319*** 0.447*** 
 (0.148) (0.112) (0.158) 
SD of Govt. investment growth 0.118*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.025) 
Ratio of bank credit to GDP -0.029* -0.041** -0.033* 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP -0.030 -0.124* -0.115* 
 (0.082) (0.065) (0.061) 
Financial openness 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ratio of remittances to GDP -0.075* -0.402** -0.186*** 
 (0.039) (0.155) (0.052) 
Constant 0.029 0.077 0.041 
 (0.032) (0.043) (0.038) 
Observations 354 354 312 
Countries 64 64 64 
R squared 0.377 0.301  
AR(1) p-value   0.006 
AR(2) p-value   0.360 
Hansen p-value   0.496 
Instruments   26 
Notes: The estimation method is one step System GMM and time effects are included in all the 
regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  “***”, “**” and “*” denote significant at 
1% level, 5 % level and 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks using alternatives of financial development in developing 
countries. Dependent variable: Standard deviation (SD) of household 
consumption per capita growth  
 Including former and 
present communist 
countries 
Excluding former and present 
communist countries 
Independent variables (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Lag of dependent variables 0.104* 0.060 0.127** 0.074 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.066) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.026* -0.018** -0.010** -0.009* 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Ratio of Govt. consumption to GDP 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.215*** 0.230*** 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.068) (0.071) 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP 0.031** 0.036** 0.040** 0.046** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
SD of GDP per capita growth 0.441*** 0.415*** 0.460*** 0.447*** 
 (0.122) (0.121) (0.155) (0.154) 
SD of Govt. investment growth 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP -0.072 -0.079 -0.115 -0.120 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.100) (0.098) 
Financial openness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ratio of bank deposit to GDP -0.028*  -0.032**  
 (0.015)  (0.012)  
Ratio of M2 to GDP  -0.028**  -0.041** 
  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Ratio of remittances to GDP -0.154*** -0.164*** -0.193** -0.179** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.083) (0.071) 
Constant 0.018 0.020 0.045 0.039 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.039) 
Observations 369 370 310 311 
Countries 83 83 63 64 
AR(1) p-value 0.020 0.004 0.028 0.007 
AR(2) p-value 0.714 0.365 0.729 0.358 
Hansen p-value 0.248 0.597 0.442 0.835 
Instruments 26 26 26 26 
Notes: The estimation method is one step System GMM and time effects are included in all the 
regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  “***”, “**” and “*” denote significant at 
1% level, 5 % level and 10 % level respectively.  
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Table 6: Robustness checks through controlling fewer variables in developing countries (including former and present communist 
countries). Dependent variable: Standard deviation (SD) of household consumption per capita growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent variables         
Lag of dependent variable 0.171*** 0.143** 0.126** 0.096 0.105* 0.071 0.074 0.076 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005* -0.023** -0.026* -0.056** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.014) (0.022) 
Ratio of Govt. consumption to GDP  0.199*** 0.192*** 0.159*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.187*** 0.190*** 
  (0.062) (0.056) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.057) (0.057) 
SD of Govt. investment growth   0.117*** 0.113*** 0.083** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
   (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP    0.027** 0.027** 0.032** 0.034** 0.034** 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
SD of GDP per capita growth     0.482*** 0.419*** 0.426*** 0.427*** 
     (0.142) (0.134) (0.123) (0.123) 
Ratio of bank credit to GDP      -0.023* -0.024* -0.024* 
      (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP       -0.075 -0.077 
       (0.071) (0.071) 
Financial openness        0.001 
        (0.002) 
Ratio of remittances to GDP -0.052** -0.115** -0.129*** -0.105** -0.131*** -0.126*** -0.121** -0.138*** 
 (0.024) (0.050) (0.031) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) 
Constant 0.044 0.035 0.006 0.010 0.009 -0.003 0.019 0.019 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.034) (0.034) 
Observations 386 386 381 381 381 380 371 371 
Countries 84 84 84 84 83 83 83 83 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
AR(2) p-value 0.422 0.372 0.419 0.391 0.371 0.317 0.378 0.374 
Hansen p-value 0.002 0.007 0.035 0.261 0.259 0.382 0.350 0.349 
Instruments 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
Notes: The estimation method is one step System GMM and time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  “***”, 
“**” and “*” denote significant at 1% level, 5 % level and 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 7: Robustness checks through controlling fewer variables in developing countries (excluding former and present communist 
countries). Dependent variable: Standard deviation (SD) of household consumption per capita growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent variable         
Lag of dependent variable 0.183*** 0.158** 0.147** 0.112* 0.123** 0.089 0.091 0.092 
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.007** -0.008*** -0.005** -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Ratio of Govt. consumption to GDP  0.207*** 0.208*** 0.156*** 0.178*** 0.183*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 
  (0.075) (0.064) (0.058) (0.054) (0.054) (0.066) (0.067) 
SD of Govt. investment growth   0.114*** 0.108*** 0.079** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
   (0.039) (0.038) (0.034) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP    0.036** 0.033** 0.041** 0.043** 0.043** 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
SD of GDP per capita growth     0.476** 0.407** 0.448*** 0.447*** 
     (0.189) (0.175) (0.157) (0.158) 
Ratio of bank credit to GDP      -0.030* -0.033* -0.033* 
      (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP       -0.113 -0.115* 
       (0.098) (0.061) 
Financial openness        0.001 
        (0.002) 
Ratio of remittances to GDP -0.111 -0.132* -0.192** -0.179** -0.173** -0.156** -0.168** -0.186*** 
 (0.090) (0.077) (0.066) (0.073) (0.071) (0.078) (0.081) (0.052) 
Constant 0.070 0.058 0.018 0.031 0.027 0.009 0.040 0.041 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.038) (0.038) 
Observations 321 321 316 316 316 315 312 312 
Countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.006 
AR(2) p-value 0.431 0.447 0.550 0.518 0.349 0.322 0.364 0.360 
Hansen p-value 0.032 0.044 0.106 0.194 0.237 0.524 0.947 0.496 
Instruments 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
Notes: The estimation method is one step System GMM and time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  “***”, 
“**” and “*” denote significant at 1% level, 5 % level and 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 8: Long run and short run effect of international remittances on household 
consumption volatility in developing countries. 
Notes: The Pesaran and Smith-type Pooled Mean Group estimators have been applied to find the 
long run and short run effects. Dependent variable is the consumption volatility (standard deviation 
of household consumption per capita growth).Standard errors are in parentheses.  “***”, “**” and 
“*” denote significant at 1% level, 5 % level and 10 % level respectively. 
 
  
 
Including former and 
present communist 
countries 
Excluding former and 
present communist 
countries 
Variables 
Long run 
coefficients 
Short run 
coefficients 
Long run 
coefficients 
Short run 
coefficients 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.8447*** -10.091 -1.4085*** -9.5466 
 (0.2507) (9.2051) (0.3326) (11.5453) 
Ratio of gov. consumption to GDP 0.0638*** 0.0399 0.0857*** 0.0430 
 (0.0186) (0.1460) (0.0258) (0.1694) 
SD of GDP per capita growth 0.8788*** 0.0569 0.9130*** 0.0751 
 (0.0373) (0.0467) (0.0494) (0.0504) 
SD of Gov. investment growth 0.0609*** 0.0095 0.0462*** 0.0019 
 (0.0102) (0.0204) (0.0148) (0.0238) 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP 0.0138** -0.0016 0.0193** -0.0256 
 (0.0058) (0.0296) (0.0085) (0.0369) 
Ratio of Bank credit to GDP -0.0147** -0.0485* -0.0176** -0.0622* 
 (0.0061) (0.0252) (0.0064) (0.0314) 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP 0.00533 -0.6894 0.0077 -0.6489 
 (0.0061) (1.3028) (0.0144) (1.5521) 
Financial Openness 0.0301 0.2523 0.0711 0.3025 
 (0.0432) (0.1832) (0.0528) (0.2116) 
Ratio of remittances to GDP -0.1809*** -0.0309** -0.2313*** -0.0537*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0116) (0.0227) (0.0186) 
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Appendix 1: List of developing countries 
Country Country Country Country 
Algeria Ecuador Mali Seychelles 
Argentina Egypt, Arab Rep. Mauritania Sierra Leone 
ArmeniaC El Salvador Mauritius South Africa 
AzerbaijanC Gabon Mexico Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Gambia, The MoldovaC Sudan 
BelarusC Guatemala MongoliaC Swaziland 
Belize Honduras Morocco TajikistanC 
Benin HungaryC MozambiqueC Tanzania 
Bhutan India Namibia Thailand 
Bolivia Indonesia Nepal Togo 
Botswana Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua Tunisia 
Brazil Jordan Nigeria Turkey 
BulgariaC KazakhstanC Oman Uganda 
Burkina Faso Kenya Pakistan UkraineC 
CambodiaC Kyrgyz RepublicC Panama Uruguay 
Cameroon Lao PDRC* Paraguay Venezuela, RB 
ChinaC* Lebanon Peru VietnamC* 
Colombia Lesotho Philippines Zambia 
Comoros Macedonia, FYRC RomaniaC  
Congo, Rep. Madagascar Russian FederationC  
Costa Rica Malawi Rwanda  
Dominican 
Republic Malaysia Senegal  
Note: “c” denotes the communist countries, and “c*” denotes the present communist countries. 
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Appendix 2: The Hausman test for fixed effect OLS estimation in all developing countries 
(including former and present communist countries. Dependent variable: Standard 
deviation of household consumption per capita growth 
                                                     ---- Coefficients ---- 
 
Notes: Time effects are not included in the regressions because the Hausman test cannot be 
performed while time and time invariant variables are included in the model. (Wooldridge, 2010; 
Aggarwal, et al., 2011) 
  
 
(b) (B) (b-B) 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
  Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
IniGDP -0.0353 -0.0125 -0.0227 0.0087 
Gov_con 0.1706 0.2256 -0.0550 0.0464 
Trade_open 0.0389 0.0580 -0.0191 0.0109 
GDP_volatility 0.3979 0.4262 -0.0283 0.0321 
Inv_volatility 0.1312 0.1690 -0.0378 0.0073 
Babk_credit -0.0267 -0.0425 0.0158 0.0156 
Aid -0.0470 0.0723 -0.1193 0.0471 
Finan_open 0.0021 0.0031 -0.0009 0.0014 
R -0.0798 -0.1357 0.0559 0.0405 
       
                                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
                                         B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
     
 chi2(9)       =            (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                     =           23.72  
 Prob>chi2  =           0.008  
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Appendix 3: The Hausman test for fixed effect OLS estimation for developing countries 
(excluding former and present communist countries). Dependent variable: Standard 
deviation (SD) of household consumption per capita growth 
                                                   ---- Coefficients ---- 
 
Notes: Time effects are not included in the regressions because the Hausman test cannot be 
performed while time and time invariant variables are included in the model (Wooldridge, 2010; 
Aggarwal, et al. 2011).  
 
(b) (B) (b-B) 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
  Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
IniGDP -0.0327 -0.0054 -0.0273 0.0105 
Gov_con 0.1345 0.1467 -0.0122 0.0421 
Trade_open 0.0277 0.0366 -0.0089 0.0122 
GDP_volatility 0.3852 0.4285 -0.0433 0.0339 
Inv_volatility 0.0977 0.1159 -0.0181 0.0073 
Babk_credit -0.0344 -0.0697 0.0353 0.0152 
Aid -0.0142 0.0412 -0.0554 0.0556 
Finan_open 0.0014 0.0022 -0.0007 0.0014 
R -0.0863 -0.1413 0.0550 0.0592 
       
                                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
                                         B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
     
 chi2(9)       =            (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                     =           18.26  
 Prob>chi2  =           0.0153  
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Appendix 4: Impact of remittances on consumption volatility (two way fixed effect OLS 
estimations including county and time fixed effects). Dependent variable: Standard 
deviation (SD) of household consumption per capita growth 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  “***”, “**” and “*” denote significant at 1% level, 5 
% level and 10 % level respectively. 
 
  
 Including former and 
present communist 
countries 
Excluding former and 
present communist 
countries 
Independent variables   
   
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.001 -0.024 
 (0.004) (0.026) 
Ratio of Gov. consumption to GDP 0.110* 0.128* 
 (0.063) (0.072) 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP 0.034*** 0.042** 
 (0.012) (0.018) 
SD of GDP per capita growth 0.357*** 0.356** 
 (0.118) (0.148) 
SD of Gov. investment growth 0.111*** 0.118*** 
 (0.021) (0.026) 
Ratio of bank credit to GDP -0.023* -0.029* 
 (0.012) (0.017) 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP 0.007 -0.030 
 (0.062) (0.082) 
Financial openness 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Ratio of remittances to GDP -0.060** -0.075* 
 (0.022) (0.039) 
Constant 0.011 0.029 
 (0.029) (0.032) 
Observations 418 354 
Countries 83 64 
R squared 0.364 0.377 
F statistic for time fixed effect 
4.25 5.16 
p-value 
0.000 0.000 
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Appendix 5: First stage IV estimation results. Dependent variable: Ratio of remittances to 
GDP 
Instruments are Weighted GDP per capita in top most remittance sending countries and Ratio of 
remittances to GDP for neighbour countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and time 
effects are included in all the regressions.  “***”, “**” and “*” denote significant at 1% level, 5 % 
level and 10 % level respectively. 
 
Independent variables 
Developing countries 
Including former and 
present communist 
countries 
Excluding former and 
present communist 
countries 
  
   
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.0453*** -0.0338*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0106) 
Ratio of Gov. consumption to GDP -0.0280 0.0222 
 (0.0530) (0.0648) 
Ratio of trade openness to GDP 0.0422*** 0.0173 
 (0.0111) (0.0130) 
SD of GDP per capita growth 0.0818 0.0516 
 (0.0735) (0.0845) 
SD of Gov. investment growth -0.0333** -0.0097 
 (0.0139) (0.0167) 
Ratio of bank credit to GDP 0.0023 0.0087 
 (0.0147) (0.0179) 
Ratio of aid flow to GDP -0.186*** -0.227*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0628) 
Financial openness 0.0039** 0.0016 
 (0.0017) (0.0022) 
Weighted GDP per capita in top most 
remittance sending countries 
0.181*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0720) 
Ratio of remittances to GDP for 
neighbour countries 
0.1130*** 0.0902*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0098) 
Constant 0.310*** 0.240*** 
 (0.0743) (0.0791) 
   
Observations 418 354 
Countries 83 64 
F test statistic 8.91 5.60 
P-value for F test 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.433 0.312 
F-statistic for weak instruments 15.54 20.19 
P-value for sargan statistic (over-
identifying restriction) 
72.90 85.38 
